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Abstract
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set
of random stable matchings. We define the least upper bound and the greatest
lower bound for both sides of the matching market, and we prove the that with
these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two dual lattices.
1 Introduction
Matchings have been studied for several decades now, beginning with Gale and Shap-
ley’s pioneering work (Gale and Shapley, 1962). They introduce the notion of stable
matchings and provide an algorithm for finding them for a marriage market. Since
then, a considerable amount of work was carried out on both the theory and applica-
tions of stable matchings. A matching is stable if all agents have acceptable partners
and there is no pair of agents, one of each side of the market, that would prefer to be
matched to each other rather than to remain with the current partner. Unfortunately,
the set of many-to-one stable matchings may be empty. Substitutability is the weakest
condition that has so far been imposed on agents’ preferences under which the ex-
istence of stable matchings is guaranteed. An agent has substitutable preferences if he
wants to continue being a partner with agents from the other side of the market even
if other agents become unavailable (see Kelso Jr and Crawford, 1982; Roth, 1984, for
more detail).
One of the most important results in the matching literature is that the set of stable
matchings in the marriage market has a dual lattice structure. This is important for
at least two reasons. First, it shows that even if agents of the same side of the market
compete for agents of the other side, the conflict is attenuated since, on the set of stable
matchings, agents on the same side of themarket have coincidence of interests. Second,
many algorithms are based on this lattice structure. For example, algorithms that yield
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stable matchings in centralized markets. Our finding is that the set of all lotteries over
stable matchings for a very general framework has a dual lattice structure.
The lattice structure of the set of stable matchings is introduced by ? for the mar-
riage market. Given two stable matchings he defines the least upper bound (l.u.b.) for
men, by matching to each man with the best of the two partners, and the greatest lower
bound (g.l.b.) for men, bymatching to eachman the less preferred between the two part-
ners; these are usually called the “pointing functions” relative to a partial order. Roth
(1985) shows that these binary operations (l.u.b. and g.l.b.) used in Knuth do not work
in the more general many-to-many and many-to-one matching markets introduced by
Kelso Jr and Crawford (1982) and Roth (1984) respectively even under substitutable
preferences. For a specific many-to-one matching market, so-called the college admis-
sion problem, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) present a natural extension of Knuth’s result
for q-responsiveness preferences. Martı´nez et al. (2001) further extended the results
proved by Roth and Sotomayor (1990). They identified a weaker condition than q-
responsiveness, called q-separability, and proposed two natural binary operations that
give a dual lattice structure to the set of stable matchings in a many-to-one matching
market with substitutable and q-separable preferences. Such binary operations were
similar to Knuth’s ones. Pepa Risma (2015) generalized the result of Martı´nez et al.
(2001) by showing that their binary operations work well in a many-to-one matching
markets where the preferences of the agents satisfy substitutability and the law of ag-
gregate demand (less restrictive than q-separability). Her paper is contextualized in
many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Manasero (2019) extended the result
in Pepa Risma (2015) to a many-to-many marching market, where one side has sub-
stitutable preferences satisfying the law of aggregate demand, and the other side has
q-responsive preferences. Alkan (2002) considered a market with multiple partners
on both sides. Preferences were given by rather general path-independent choice func-
tions that do not necessarily respect any ordering on individuals and satisfy cardinal
monotonicity.1 He shows that the set of stable matchings in any two-sided market with
path-independent cardinal monotone choice functions has a lattice structure under the
common preferences of all agents on any side of the market. Li (2014) proved that the
set of stable matchings in a many-to-many matching market under substitutable and
cardinalmonotone preferences has a lattice structure. The distinction between Li (2014)
and Alkan (2002) lies in the conditions on preferences: Li (2014) assumes agents have
complete preference ordering, whereas Alkan (2002) assumes agents have incomplete
revealed preference orderings. All of these mentioned papers share natural definitions
of the binary operations via pointing functions.
In an other direction, there is an extensive literature that proves that the set of stable
1Alkan (2002) called “cardinal monotonicity” to “the law of aggregated demand”.
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matchings has a lattice structure (see Adachi, 2000; Fleiner, 2003; Echenique and Oviedo,
2006; Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005; Ostrovsky, 2008;Wu and Roth, 2018, among others).
All of this papers have a difficult way to compute the binary operations, as fixed points.
In this paper, we study random stable matchings. Random stable matchings are
very useful for at least two reasons. First, the randomization allows for a much richer
space of possible outcomes and may be essential to achieve fairness, anonymity and
(ex-ante) equal-treatment-of-equals. Second, the framework of random stable match-
ings admits fractional matchings that capture time-sharing arrangements, (see Roth et al.,
1993; Teo and Sethuraman, 1998; Baı¨ou and Balinski, 2000; Dog˘an and Yıldız, 2016; Neme and Oviedo,
2019a,b, among others). Roth et al. (1993) define a stable fractional matching to be a
not necessarily integer solution of a linear program. They characterized stable match-
ings of the marriage market as the extreme points of the convex polytope generated by
linear inequalities. Hence, in the marriage market, stable fractional matchings and ran-
dom stable matchings are equivalent. However, in more general markets, the convex
polytope may have fractional extreme points. This means that this equivalence does
not hold, (see Baı¨ou and Balinski, 2000; Neme and Oviedo, 2019b, among others).
Roth et al. (1993), defines two binary operations for random stable matchings. They
proved that a set of stable fractional matchings,2 endowed with a partial order (first-
order stochastic dominance) has a lattice structure. Neme and Oviedo (2019a) charac-
terized the set of strongly stable fractional matchings of the marriage market. Also,
they proved that the set of strongly stable fractional matchings endowed with the
same partial order (first-order stochastic dominance), has a lattice structure (and it is
a sub-lattice of the set of stable fractional matchings). The binary operation defined
in Roth et al. (1993) can not be extended to a more general markets, not even to the
college admission problem with q-responsive preferences. As far as we know, these
two papers (Roth et al., 1993; Neme and Oviedo, 2019a) are the only ones that study
the lattice structure of random stable matchings.
Our contribution here is that the set of random stable matchings has a lattice struc-
ture for a very general framework. That is, as long as the set of (deterministic) stable
matchings has a lattice structure, where the binary operations are defined via pointing
functions, the set of random stable matchings has a lattice structure. Therefore, relying
on Li (2014), the framework in this paper is a many-to-many matching market where
all agents have substitutable preference satisfying the law of aggregate demand. To
define the binary operations between the two random stable matchings of this general
many-to-many matching market, first we show that any random stable matching can
be represented by a unique lottery over stable matchings that fulfils a decreasing prop-
2Recall that for the marriage market, the stable fractional matchings coincide with the random stable
matchings.
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erty. That is, each stable matching of the new representation is comparable in the eyes
of all firms. Then, we present an algorithm that given two random stable matchings
that fulfils the decreasing property, returns two lotteries that represent them and have
the same number of terms in their sums. Moreover, the new way to represent the two
random stable matchings has a very important property: both lotteries have the same
scalars, term to term. We define a partial order for random stable matchings that relies
on this common representation. We also define the associate binary operations of this
partial order and prove that the set of random stable matchings has a dual lattice struc-
ture. For the special case in which all the scalars of the lottery are rational numbers,
we show that there is a very easy way to compute the l.u.b. and the g.l.b., with no need
of the algorithm (that changes the representation of the random stable matchings). For
a restriction of our setting to a one-to-one market (a marriage market), we prove that
the partial order defined here, coincides with the first-order stochastic dominance, de-
fined in Roth et al. (1993). Hence, our result is an extension of the ones presented in
Roth et al. (1993); Neme and Oviedo (2019a).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the matching market
and preliminary results. In Section 3, first, we prove that there is a unique way to
represent a random stable matching with a decreasing property. Then, we also present
an algorithm that changes the representation of two random stable matchings so that
they can be compared and binary operations can be computed. Section 4 contains the
main result of the paper stating that the set of random stable matching has a dual lattice
structure. Section 5 has two subsections. In the first one, we prove the equivalence
between our partial order and the first-order stochastic dominance contextualized to
the special case of the marriage market. In the second subsection, we show how to
compute the l.u.b. and the g.l.b. for rational random stablematchings (these are random
stable matchings where all scalars of their lotteries are rational numbers). Section 6
contains some conclusions. Finally, Section 7 is an Appendix with technical results.
2 Preliminaries
We consider many-to-many matching markets, where there are two disjoint sets of
agents, the set of firms F and the set of workers W. Each firm has an antisymmetric,
transitive and complete preference relation (≥ f ) over the set of all subsets of W. In
the same way, each worker has an antisymmetric, transitive and complete preference
relation (≥w) over the set of all subsets of F. We denote by P the preference profile
for all agents, firms and workers. The many-to-many matching market is denoted by
(F,W, P). Given a set of firms S ⊆ F, each worker w ∈ W can determine which subset
of S would most prefer to hire. We call this the w’s choice set from S and denote it by
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Ch(S,>w). Formally,
Ch(S,>w) = max>w{T : T ⊆ S}.
Symmetrically, given a set of workers S ⊆ W, let Ch(S,> f ) denote firm f ’s most pre-
ferred subset of S according to its preference relation > f . Formally,
Ch(S,> f ) = max> f {T : T ⊆ S}.
Definition 1 A matching µ is a function from the set F ∪W into 2F∪W such that for each
w ∈W and for each f ∈ F:
1. µ(w) ⊆ F;
2. µ( f ) ⊆ W;
3. w ∈ µ( f ) ⇔ f ∈ µ(w)
We say that agent a ∈ F ∪W is matched si µ(a) 6= ∅, otherwise he is unmatched.
A matching µ is blocked by agent a if µ(a) 6= Ch(µ(a),>a). We say that a matching
is individually rational if it is not blocked by any individual agent. A matching µ is
blocked by a worker-firm pair (w, f ) if w /∈ µ( f ),w ∈ Ch(µ( f ) ∪ w,> f ), and f ∈
Ch(µ(w) ∪ f ,>w). A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or
any worker-firm pair. The set of stable matchings is denoted by S(P).
Given a preference profile P, and two stable matchings µ and µ′, let µ ≥F µ
′ that all
firms like µ at least as well as µ′, with at least one firm preferring µ to µ′ outright. In
a precisely similar way, we define ≥W. Notice that, ≥F and ≥W are partial orders over
the set of stable matchings.
An agent a’s preferences relation satisfies substitutability if, for any subset S of the
opposite set (for instance, if a ∈ F then S ⊆ W) that contains agent b, b ∈ Ch(S,>a)
implies b ∈ Ch(S′ ∪ {b},>a) for all S′ ⊆ S. We say that an agent a’s preference relation
(>a) satisfies the law of aggregated demand (LAD) if for all subset S of the opposite set
and all S′ ⊆ S, |Ch(S′ ,>a)| ≤ |Ch(S,>a)|. 3
For a matching market (F,W, P) where the preference relation of all agents satisfies
substitutability and LAD, Li (2014) prove that the set of stable matchings has a lattice
structure. Given two stable matchings µ1 and µ2, the l.u.b. for firms is denoted by
µ1 ∨F µ2 and the g.l.b. for firms is denoted by µ1 ∧F µ2. Similarly, the l.u.b. for workers
is denoted by µ1 ∨W µ2 and the g.l.b. for the workers is denoted by µ1 ∧W µ2. Li (2014)
define the binary operations as follows,
µ1 ∨F µ2( f ) = µ1 ∧W µ2( f ) = Ch(µ1( f ) ∪ µ2( f ),> f ), for all firms f ∈ F,
3|S| denotes the number of agents in S.
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µ1 ∨F µ2(w) = µ1 ∧W µ2(w) = { f |w ∈ Ch(µ1( f )∪ µ2( f ),> f )}, for all workers w ∈W.
Similarly,
µ1 ∨W µ2(w) = µ1 ∧F µ2(w) = Ch(µ1(w) ∪ µ2(w),>w), for all workers w ∈W,
µ1 ∨W µ2( f ) = µ1 ∧F µ2( f ) = {w| f ∈ Ch(µ1(w) ∪ µ2(w),>w)}, for all firms f ∈ F.
Remark 1 Given two stable matchings µ1 and µ2, Li (2014) proved that µ1 ∨F µ2, µ1 ∧F µ2,
µ1 ∨W µ2 and µ1 ∧W µ2(w) are also stable matchings.
To define random stable matchings, we need to define an incidence vector as follows:
Definition 2 Given a stable matching µ, a vector xµ ∈ {0, 1}|F|×|W| is an incidence vector
when x
µ
i,j = 1 if and only if j ∈ µ (i) and x
µ
i,j = 0 otherwise.
Denote by S(P) the set of stable matchings. Now, we formally define a random
stable matching.
Definition 3 We say that x is a random stable matching, if it is a lottery over stable match-
ings. That is,
x = ∑
ν∈S(P)
λµx
µ
where 0 < λµ ≤ 1, ∑µ∈S(P) λµ = 1, and µ ∈ S(P).
Notice that, each entry of a random stable matching x, fulfils that xi,j ∈ [0, 1].
3 New representations for random stable matchings
In this section, we present two important results that we use in the next section in
order to prove that the set of random stable matchings has a lattice structure. First, we
prove that given a random stable matching, there is a unique way to represent it with
a decreasing property, namely, there is {µ1, . . . , µk} ⊆ S(P) and λ1, . . . , λk such that
x = ∑kℓ=1 λℓx
µℓ and µℓ ≥F µℓ+1 for ℓ = 1, . . . , k− 1. Also, given two random stable
matchings, we present an algorithm that changes the representation of each lottery
with a very particular property. So, it allows us to define the binary operations (l.u.b.
and g.l.b.) for random stable matchings in a very intuitive and direct way.
Given a random stable matching x, the support of x is denoted as follows:
supp(x) = {(i, j) : xi,j > 0}.
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Given a random stable matching x, i.e. x = ∑ν∈S(P) λνx
ν; 0 < λν ≤ 1, ∑ν∈S(P) λν =
1, we define A to be the set of all stable matchings involve in the lottery. Formally,
A =
{
ν ∈ S(P) : x = ∑
ν∈S(P)
λνx
ν; 0 < λν ≤ 1, ∑
ν∈S(P)
λν = 1
}
.
We define A∨ ⊆ S(P) to be the set where each stable matching is the l.u.b. between
each pair of stable matchings in A.4 Formally,
A∨ =
{ ∨
ν∈T
ν : T ⊆ A
}
.
Similarly, we define A∧ ⊆ S(P) to be the set where each stable matching is the g.l.b.
between each pair of stable matchings in A. Formally,
A∧ =
{ ∧
ν∈T
ν : T ⊆ A
}
.
We denote by B1 = A ∪ A
∨ ∪ A∧. Since that l.u.b. and g.l.b. are computed by a
pointing function, we have that each stable matching µ ∈ B1 fulfills that supp(x
µ) ⊆
supp(x). Let µ1 denote the most preferred stable matching in B1, in the eyes of all firms.
We can select µ1 as follows:
µ1 =
∨
ν∈B1
ν.
Once we define the first stable matching of the new representation of x, we have to de-
fine the first scalar. Let α1 = min{xi,j such that x
µ1
i,j = 1} be such scalar. The following
theorem states that given a random stable matching, we can represent this lottery in-
volving stable matchings that fulfils the decreasing property in the sense of the firm’s
preferences. This theorem has a constructive proof. Then, in each step of this construc-
tion, starting with B1, we need to eliminate at least one stable matching from this set
(B1). To do so, we define C1 as follows:
C1 = {ν ∈ B1 : there is a pair (i, j) ∈ supp(x
ν) such that xi,j = α1 and x
µ1
i,j = 1}.
Now, we are in position to formalize our first theorem:
Theorem 1 Let x be a random stable matching. Then, there is a unique set of stable matchings
{µ1, . . . , µI} and a unique set of scalars {α1, . . . , αI} such that, x = ∑
I
ℓ=1 αℓµ
ℓ with 0 <
αℓ < 1, ∑
I
ℓ=1 αℓ = 1 and µ
ℓ ≥F µ
ℓ+1 for each ℓ = 1, . . . , I − 1.
4When no confuses arise, we slightly abuse notation and write A∨ instead of A∨F to denote the set
where each stable matching is the l.u.b. between each pair of stable matchings in A (for one side of the
market, the firm’s side). The same for A∧,
∨
ν∈T ν and
∧
ν∈T ν.
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Proof. Let x be a random stable matching. Let µ1 and α1 defined as before.
Let x1 = x−α1x
µ1
1−α1
. If x1 is the incidence vector of a stable matching 5, then x =
α1µ
1+(1− α1)ν with 0 < α1 < 1 and µ
1 ≥F ν. If not, let µ
2 =
∨
ν∈B2 and α2 = min{x
1
i,j :
(i, j) ∈ supp(xµ
2
)}, where B2 = B1 \C1. Lemma 3 in the Appendix, proves that C1 6= ∅.
Then, B2 ⊂ B1. By definition, we have that C2 = {ν ∈ B1 : there is a pair (i, j) ∈
supp(xν) such that x1i,j = α2 and x
µ1
i,j = 1}, and B3 = B2 \C2. Notice that, since µ
2 ∈ C2,
C2 6= ∅. Hence, B3 ⊂ B2.
Let x2 = x
1−α2x
µ2
1−α2
. If x2 is the incidence vector of a stable matching, then x = α1µ
1+
(1− α1)α2µ
2 + (1− α1)(1− α2)ν, with 0 < α1 < 1, 0 < α2 < 1 and µ
1 ≥F µ
2 ≥F ν. If
not, we continue this process, until ends by the finiteness of the set of stable matchings,
and the strictly embedding of the sets Bl (i.e Bl ⊂ Bl+1), (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix).
Denote by β1 = α1, β2 = (1− α1)α2, β3 = (1− α1)(1− α2)α3, . . . and so on. Math-
ematical induction proves that ∑l βl = 1; for more details, see Lemma 4 in the Ap-
pendix.
Then, we represent x as a lottery of stable matchings such that, µℓ ≥F µ
ℓ+1.
Uniqueness: Assume that the random stable matching x has two different repre-
sentation:
x =
H
∑
h=1
αhν
h =
K
∑
k=1
βkν
k
with 0 < αh ≤ 1 for h = 1, . . . ,H; 0 < βk ≤ 1 for k = 1, . . . ,K; ∑
H
h=1 αh = 1; and
∑
K
k=1 βk = 1.
Since the l.u.b. and g.l.b. between two stable matchings is computed by the pointing
function, it is straightforward that
µ1 =
∨
h=1,...,H
νh =
∨
k=1,...,K
νk.
In the same way for each µℓ of the construction. Then, the lottery is unique. 
Example 1 illustrates Theorem 1.
Example 1 Let (F,W, P) be a many-to-one matching market instance where F = { f1, f2, f3, f4},
W = {w1,w2,w3,w4} and the preferences profile is given by
5That is, if there is ν ∈ S(P) such that x1 = xν.
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> f1= {w1,w2}, {w1,w3}, {w2,w4}, {w3,w4},w1,w2,w3,w4
> f2= {w3,w4}, {w2,w4}, {w1,w3}, {w1,w2},w3,w4,w1,w2
> f3= {w1,w3}, {w3,w4}, {w1,w2}, {w2,w4},w1,w3,w2,w4
> f4= {w2,w4}, {w1,w2}, {w3,w4}, {w1,w3},w2,w4,w1,w3
>w1= { f2, f4}, { f2, f3}, { f1, f4}, { f1, f3}, f2, f4, f3, f1
>w2= { f2, f3}, { f1, f3}, { f2, f4}, { f1, f4}, f2, f3, f1, f4
>w3= { f1, f4}, { f2, f4}, { f1, f3}, { f2, f3}, f1, f4, f2, f3
>w4= { f1, f3}, { f1, f4}, { f2, f3}, { f2, f4}, f1, f3, f4, f2
It is easy to check that this preference profile are substitutable and satisfy LAD. The set of stable
matchings and its lattice are represented respectively in Table 1 and Figure 1.
f1 f2 f3 f4
ν1 {w1,w2} {w3,w4} {w1,w3} {w2,w4}
ν2 {w1,w3} {w2,w4} {w3,w4} {w1,w2}
ν3 {w2,w4} {w1,w3} {w1,w2} {w3,w4}
ν4 {w3,w4} {w1,w2} {w2,w4} {w1,w3}
Table 1
ν1
ν2 ν3
ν4
Figure 1
Let x = 34x
ν1 + 14x
ν2 be a random stable matching. Now we change the representation of x
as in Theorem 1. Notice that
x =


3
4
1
4
3
4
1
4
1
4
3
4
1
4
3
4
1
4
1
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
1
4
1
4

 .
Then, A = {ν2, ν3}, A
∨ = {ν1} and A
∧ = {ν4}. Then, B1 = {ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4}. Notice that
µ1 = ν1, α1 =
1
4 and C1 = {ν1, ν3}.
x1 =
x− 14x
µ1
1− 14
=


2
3 0 1
1
3
1
3 1 0
2
3
0 13
2
3 1
1 23
1
3 0

 .
Now, B2 = B1 \ C1 = {ν2, ν4}, µ
2 = ν2, α2 =
2
3 and C2 = {ν2}. Then,
x2 =
x− 23x
µ2
1− 23
=


0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0

 .
Notice that x2 = ν7. Here, B3 = B2 \ C2 = {ν4}, µ
3 = ν4, α3 = 1 and C3 = {ν7}. Then,
we have that B4 = ∅ and the procedure stops.
Therefore,
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x = 14x
µ1 + (1− 14)(
2
3 )x
µ2 + (1− 14)(1−
2
3)(1)x
µ3
= 14x
µ1 + 12x
µ2 + 14x
µ3 .
Since µ1 = ν1, µ
2 = ν2 and µ
3 = ν4, then x can be written as:
x = 14x
ν1 + 12x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 .
As we can see in Figure 1, the stable matchings of the lottery fulfils that ν1 ≥F ν2 ≥F ν4.
From now on, by Theorem 1, we assume that each random stable matching is al-
ready represented as a lottery over stable matchings in a decreasing way.
In order to define the two binary operations, given two random stable matchings,
the algorithm below allows us to change the representation of the two random stable
matchings involved. Proposition 1 will say that the two lotteries have the same number
of terms of the sum and the same scalars, term to term.
Let x and y be two random stable matchings such that,
x =
I
∑
ℓ=1
α0
ℓ
µx
ℓ
and y =
J
∑
ℓ=1
β0
ℓ
µ
y
ℓ
.
Denote by
I0 = {1, . . . , I} and J0 = {1, . . . , J}.
Assume that |I0| > 1 or |J0| > 1. If |I0| = |J0| = 1, then x and y are stable
matchings, and there is no need of the algorithm.
Algorithm:
Step 1 Let γ1 = min{α
0
1, β
0
1}. Then, for each ℓ ∈ I
0, J0 define:
α1
ℓ
and β1
ℓ
as follows:
α1
ℓ
:=


α01 − γ1 if γ1 6= α
0
1 and ℓ = 1
α0
ℓ
if γ1 6= α
0
1 and ℓ > 1
α0
ℓ−1 if γ1 = α
0
1 and ℓ > 1.
β1
ℓ
:=


β01 − γ1 if γ1 6= β
0
1 and ℓ = 1
β0
ℓ
if γ1 6= β
0
1 and ℓ > 1
β0
ℓ−1 if γ1 = β
0
1 and ℓ > 1.
If γ1 = α
0
1, then I
1 := I0 \maxℓ{ℓ ∈ I
0}. If γ1 6= α
0
1, then I
1 := I0.
If γ1 = β
0
1, then J
1 := J0 \maxℓ{ℓ ∈ J
0}. If γ1 6= β
0
1, then J
1 := J0.
Define µ˜x1 = µ
x
1 and µ˜
y
1 = µ
y
1.
Step k > 1 – If |Ik−1| = 1 and |Jk−1| = 1, the procedure stops.
Then, γk = α
k−1
1 = β
k−1
1 , and define µ˜
x
k = µ
x
I and µ˜
y
k = µ
y
J , and x =
∑
k
ℓ=1 γℓµ˜
x
ℓ
, and y = ∑kℓ=1 γℓµ˜
y
ℓ
.
10
– If |Ik−1| > 1 or |Jk−1| > 1, the procedure continues as follows:
Let γk = min{α
k−1
1 , β
k−1
1 }. Then, for each ℓ ∈ I
k−1, Jk−1 define:
If γk 6= α
k−1
1 , then I
k := Ik−1 and αk
ℓ
:=
{
αk−11 − γk if ℓ = 1,
αk−1
ℓ
if ℓ > 1.
If γk = α
k−1
1 , then I
k := Ik−1 \maxℓ{ℓ ∈ I
k−1} and αk
ℓ−1 = α
k−1
ℓ
.
If γk 6= β
k−1
1 , then J
k := Jk−1 and βk
ℓ
:=
{
βk−11 − γk if ℓ = 1,
βk−1
ℓ
if ℓ > 1.
If γk = β
k−1
1 , then J
k := Jk−1 \maxℓ{ℓ ∈ J
k−1} and βk
ℓ−1 = β
k−1
ℓ
.
Let p = |I0| − |Ik−1| and r = |J0| − |Jk−1|, then define µ˜xk = µ
x
p+1 and µ˜
y
k =
µ
y
r+1.
Lemma 1 The algorithm stops in a finite number of steps. That is, there is a k˜ such that
|I k˜−1| = |J k˜−1| = 1 and αk˜1 = β
k˜
1.
Proof. Note that in each step of the algorithm, we have that |Ik| = |Ik−1| − 1 or |Jk| =
|Jk−1| − 1. We also have that in each step k of the algorithm,
∑
ℓ∈Ik
αk
ℓ
= ∑
ℓ∈Ik−1
αk−1
ℓ
− γk and ∑
ℓ∈Jk
βk
ℓ
= ∑
ℓ∈Jk−1
βk−1
ℓ
− γk.
Hence,
∑
ℓ∈Ik
αk
ℓ
= ∑
ℓ∈I0
α0
ℓ
−
k
∑
t=1
γt = 1−
k
∑
t=1
γt.
Similarly,
∑
ℓ∈Jk
βk
ℓ
= ∑
ℓ∈J0
β0
ℓ
−
k
∑
t=1
γt = 1−
k
∑
t=1
γt.
That is, for each k we have that
∑
ℓ∈Ik
αk
ℓ
= ∑
ℓ∈Jk
βk
ℓ
= 1−
k
∑
t=1
γt. (1)
Since |I0| and |J0| are finite, |Ik| = |Ik−1| − 1 or |Jk| = |Jk−1| − 1 and (1), we have
that there is a k˜ such that |I k˜−1| = |J k˜−1| = 1 and αk˜1 = β
k˜
1.

Proposition 1 states that the algorithm changes the representation of the two ran-
dom stable matchings used as input.
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Proposition 1 Let x and y be two random stable matchings such that
x =
I
∑
ℓ=1
α0
ℓ
µx
ℓ
and y =
J
∑
ℓ=1
β0
ℓ
µ
y
ℓ
.
Then, there are
{
γℓ, µ˜
x
ℓ
, µ˜
y
ℓ
}k˜
ℓ=1
defined by the algorithm, where k˜ is the last step of the algo-
rithm such that
x =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓµ˜
x
ℓ
and y =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓµ˜
y
ℓ
.
Proof. First we prove there is k1 such that for α
0
1 = ∑
k1
t=1 γt. Since γ1 = min{α
0
1, β
0
1},
we analyze two cases.
Case 1: γ1 = α
0
1. In this case k1 = 1. Then,
γ1µ˜
x
1 = γ1µ
x
1 = α
0
1µ
x
1 .
Notice that |I1| = |I0| − 1. That is, 1 = p = |I0| − |I1| and µ˜x2 = µ
x
2 . Then,
for each k ≥ 2 we have that µ˜xk 6= µ
x
1 .
Case 2: γ1 < α
0
1. In this case we have that |I
0| = |I1| and α11 = α
0
1− γ1. Then, in the
next step γ2 ≤ α
1
1.
If γ2 = α
1
1, then α
0
1 = γ1 + γ2 and |I
0| = |I1|. Then, µ˜x2 = µ
x
1 and
γ1µ˜
x
1 + γ2µ˜
x
2 = (γ1 + γ2)µ
x
1 = α
0
1µ
x
1 .
Notice that |I2| = |I1| − 1. That is, 1 = p = |I0| − |I2| and µ˜x3 = µ
x
2 . Then,
for each k ≥ 3 we have that µ˜xk 6= µ
x
1 .
If γ2 < α
1
1, then repeat this procedure until find k1 such that γk1 = α
k1−1
1 .
Then α01 = ∑
k1
t=1 γt and |I
0| = |I1| = . . . = |Ik1 |. Then, µ˜xt = µ
x
1 for t =
1, . . . , k1 and
k1
∑
t=1
γtµ˜
x
t =
k1
∑
t=1
γtµ
x
1 = α
0
1µ
x
1 .
Notice that |Ik1 | = |Ik1−1| − 1. That is, 1 = p = |I0| − |Ik1 | and µ˜xk1+1 = µ
x
2 .
Then, for each k ≥ k1 + 1 we have that µ˜
x
k 6= µ
x
1 .
Once we find k1, we have to repeat this procedure with each α
0
ℓ
for ℓ ≥ 2.
The case for β is similar. 
Example 1: Continue. Let x = 14x
ν1 + 12x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 and y = 16x
ν1 + 12x
ν3 + 13x
ν4 . Notice
that both random stable matchings are represented as in Theorem 1. We use the algorithm to
change their representation. Let I0 = {1, 2, 3} and J0 = {1, 2, 3}.
12
Step 1 γ1 = min{
1
4 ,
1
6} =
1
6 . Then, define:
α11 =
1
4 −
1
6 =
1
12
α12 =
1
2
α13 =
1
4
β11 =
1
2
β12 =
1
3
Then, I1 = {1, 2, 3}, J1 = {1, 2}, µ˜x1 = ν1 and µ˜
y
1 = ν1.
Step 2 γ2 = min{
1
12 ,
1
2} =
1
12 . Then, define:
α21 =
1
2
α22 =
1
4
β21 =
1
2 −
1
12 =
5
12
β22 =
1
3
Then, I2 = {1, 2}, J2 = {1, 2}, µ˜x2 = ν1 and µ˜
y
2 = ν3.
Step 3 γ3 = min{
1
2 ,
5
12} =
5
12 . Then, define:
α31 =
1
2 −
5
12 =
1
12
α32 =
1
4
β31 =
1
4
Then, I3 = {1, 2}, J3 = {1}, µ˜x3 = ν2 and µ˜
y
3 = ν3.
Step 4 γ4 = min{
1
12 ,
1
4} =
1
12 . Then, define:
α41 =
1
4 β
4
1 =
1
4 −
1
12 =
1
4
Then, I4 = {1}, J4 = {1}, µ˜x4 = ν2 and µ˜
y
4 = ν4.
Step 5 γ6 = min{
1
4 ,
1
4} =
1
4 .
Then, I5 = J5 = ∅, µ˜x6 = ν4 and µ˜
y
6 = ν4.
Therefore, we can represent the random stable matchings x and y as follows:
x = 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 512x
ν2 + 112x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 ,
y = 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν3 + 512x
ν3 + 112x
ν4 + 14x
ν4 .
Observe that x and y have five terms in each representation. Moreover, both lotter-
ies have the same scalar, term to term.
4 Main result
In this section, we first define a partial order. Next, using that partial order and Propo-
sition 1, we define two binary operations for random stable matchings. Themain result
of this paper states that with these two ingredients, the set of random stable matchings
has a dual lattice structure.
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From now on, each random stable matching is represented as in Proposition 1. That
is, given x and y, we write
x =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓµ˜
x
ℓ
and y =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓµ˜
y
ℓ
where, for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜, 0 < γℓ ≤ 1, ∑
k˜
ℓ=1 γℓ = 1, µ˜
x
ℓ
∈ S(P), and for each
ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜− 1, µ˜x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
x
ℓ+1 and µ˜
y
ℓ
≥F µ˜
y
ℓ+1.
Now, we define when x dominates y for one side of the market.
Definition 4 We say that x dominates y for all firms (x F y) if µ˜
x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
y
ℓ
for each ℓ =
1, . . . , k˜. Analogously, we define x W y for all workers.
Once each lottery is represented as in Proposition 1, the partial order over random
stable matchings is very natural. Now, the reader can see that the following proof relies
on the partial order of (deterministic) stable matchings.
Lemma 2 The relations F and W are partial orders. Also, F and W are dual.
Proof.
We prove that F is a partial order. The proof for x W y is analogous.
Transitivity: If x F y and y F z, then x F z. We have that µ˜
x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
y
ℓ
for each
ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜ and µ˜
y
ℓ
≥F µ˜
z
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Then, by transitivity of the partial order
≥F, we have that µ˜
x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
z
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Then, x F z.
Reflexivity: x F x for all x. By reflexivity of the partial order ≥F, it is straightfor-
ward that µ˜x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
x
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Then, x F x.
Antisymmetry: If x F y and y F x, then x = y. We have that µ˜
x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
y
ℓ
and
µ˜
y
ℓ
≥F µ˜
x
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Then, by antisymmetry of the partial order ≥F, we have
that µ˜x
ℓ
= µ˜z
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Then, x = y. Therefore, the relation F is a partial
order.
Duality: Since the partial orders≥F and≥W for stable matchings are dual, then the
partial orders F and W are dual as well.

Recall that ∨W , ∧W , ∨F and ∧F are the binary operations relative to the partial
orders W and F defined between two (deterministic) stable matchings. Now, we
extend these binary operations for random stable matchings. Formally,
Definition 5 Let x and y be two random stable matchings such that
x =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓµ˜
x
ℓ
and y =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓµ˜
y
ℓ
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where for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜, 0 < γℓ ≤ 1, ∑
k˜
ℓ=1 γℓ = 1, µ˜
x
ℓ
∈ S(P), and for each ℓ =
1, . . . , k˜− 1, µ˜x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
x
ℓ+1 and µ˜
y
ℓ
≥F µ˜
y
ℓ+1.
Define x ⊻F y, x ⊼F y, x ⊻W y and x ⊼W y as follows:
x ⊻F y :=
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓ(µ˜
x
ℓ
∨F µ˜
y
ℓ
) , x ⊼F y :=
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓ(µ˜
x
ℓ
∧F µ˜
y
ℓ
),
and
x ⊻W y :=
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓ(µ˜
x
ℓ
∨W µ˜
y
ℓ
) , x ⊼W y :=
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓ(µ˜
x
ℓ
∧W µ˜
y
ℓ
),
Remark 2 It is straightforward from Remark 1 that x ⊻F y, x ⊼F y, x ⊻W y and x ⊼W y are
random stable matchings.
Now, we are in position to prove that these binary operations defined for random
stable matchings are actually the l.u.b. and g.l.b. for each side of the market.
Theorem 2 Let x and y be two random stable matchings. Then, for X ∈ {F,W} we have that
x ⊻X y = l.u.b.X(x, y) and x ⊼X y = g.l.b.X(x, y).
Also,
x ⊻F y = x ⊼W y and x ⊻W y = x ⊼F y.
Proof.
• We prove that x ⊻X y = l.u.b.X(x, y).
(i) x ⊻X y X x :
Since µ˜x
ℓ
∨X µ˜
y
ℓ
≥X µ˜
x
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜, then x ⊻X y X x.
(ii) x ⊻X y X y :
Since µ˜x
ℓ
∨X µ˜
y
ℓ
≥X µ˜
y
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜, then x ⊻X y X y.
(iii) If z X x and z X y, then z X x ⊻ y:
We have that µ˜z
ℓ
≥X µ˜
x
ℓ
and µ˜z
ℓ
≥X µ˜
y
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Since, µ˜x
ℓ
∨X µ˜
y
ℓ
is the l.u.b.X(µ˜
x
ℓ
, µ˜
y
ℓ
), then µ˜z
ℓ
≥X µ˜
x
ℓ
∨X µ˜
y
ℓ
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k˜. Hence,
z X x ⊻X y.
• The proof for x ⊼X y = g.l.b.X(x, y) is analogous.
• x ⊻F y = x ⊼W y :
Recall that the lattices of stable matchings are dual, that is given µ1, µ2 ∈ S(P)
µ1 ∨F µ2 = µ1 ∧W µ2. By Definition 5, we have that for 0 < γℓ ≤ 1; ∑
k˜
ℓ=1 γℓ = 1,
µ˜x
ℓ
∈ S(P) , µ˜x
ℓ
≥F µ˜
x
ℓ+1 and µ˜
y
ℓ
≥F µ˜
y
ℓ+1,
x ⊻F y =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓ(µ˜
x
ℓ ∨F µ˜
y
ℓ
) =
k˜
∑
ℓ=1
γℓ(µ˜
x
ℓ ∧W µ˜
y
ℓ
) = x ⊼W y.
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• The proof for x ⊻W y = x ⊼F y is analogous.

Let (F,W, P) be a matching market and denote by RM the set of random stable
matchings.
Theorem 3 Let (F,W, P) be a matching market. Then, (RM,F) and (RM,W) are dual
lattices.
Example 1:(Continued) Given x and y represented as in Proposition 1, we compute now x⊻F y
and x ⊼F y as follows:(The other two cases are similar)
x = 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 512x
ν2 + 112x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 ,
y = 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν3 + 512x
ν3 + 112x
ν4 + 14x
ν4 .
x ⊻F y =
1
6x
ν1∨Fν1 + 112x
ν1∨Fν3 + 512x
ν2∨Fν3 + 112x
ν2∨Fν4 + 14x
ν4∨Fν4
= 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 512x
ν1 + 112x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 ,
= 23x
ν1 + 112x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 .
x ⊼F y =
1
6x
ν1∧Fν1 + 112x
ν1∧Fν3 + 512x
ν2∧Fν3 + 112x
ν2∧Fν4 + 14x
ν4∧Fν4
= 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν3 + 512x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 + 14x
ν4 ,
= 16x
ν1 + 112x
ν3 + 34x
ν4 .
5 Two particular cases
We first analyse our result to the case of the marriage market. Second, we compute in a
very simple way the binary operations between two rational random stable matchings
(each scalar of the lottery is a rational number).
5.1 The marriage market
In this sub-section we prove that in the special case of the marriage market (M,W, P),
the partial order defined in Section 4 is equivalent to the first-order stochastic domi-
nance defined by Roth et al. (1993). For the marriage market, Roth et al. (1993) define a
stable fractional matching as a not necessarily integer solution of a linear program (see
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Roth et al., 1993, for more details). Recall that, for the marriage market, random sta-
ble matchings and stable factional matchings are equivalent.6 Then, a random stable
matching is a bi-stochastic matrix, where each entry, xm,w is the probability of man m
and woman w to be matched.
Remark 3 Given the random stable matching x, the entry xm,w = ∑k:w=µxk (m)
γk where γk is
defined by the algorithm. Then,
∑
j≥mw
xm,j = ∑
k:µxk (m)≥mw
γk.
In the same way for the random stable matching y.
Now, we present the definition of the partial order used by Roth et al. (1993).
Definition 6 x weakly dominates y in man’s opinion, (here denoted by x ⋆m y) if
∑
j≥mw
xm,j ≥ ∑
j≥mw
ym,j
for each w ∈ W.
We say that x ⋆M y if and only if x 
⋆
m y for each m ∈ M.
Proposition 2 The partial order (M) is equivalent to 
⋆
M.
Proof. To prove that M is equivalent to 
⋆
M, we need to prove that for each m ∈ M
and each w ∈W,
∑
j≥mw
xm,j ≥ ∑
j≥mw
ym,j
if and only if
∑
k:µxk (m)≥mw
γk ≥ ∑
k:µ
y
k(m)≥mw
γk.
=⇒) Assume that for each m ∈ M and each w ∈W,
∑
j≥mw
xm,j ≥ ∑
j≥mw
ym,j.
Also assume that there are m1 ∈ M, w1,w2 ∈ W and k1 ∈ {1, . . . , k˜} such that
w1 = µ
x
k1
(m1) <m1 µ
y
k1
(m1) = w2
6The extreme points of the polytope generated by the linear constraints are exactly the stable match-
ings, (see Theorem 13 in Roth et al., 1993).
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and for each k < k1 we have that µ
x
k (m1) ≥m1 µ
y
k(m1). Then, we have that
∑
k:µxk (m)≥mw
γk + γk1 = ∑
k:µ
y
k(m)≥mw
γk.
Hence, by Remark 3, we have that
∑
j≥mw
xm,j = ∑
k:µxk (m)≥mw
γk < ∑
k:µ
y
k(m)≥mw
γk = ∑
j≥mw
ym,j,
a contradiction.
⇐=) This part of the proof is straightforward. By Remark 3 we have that:
∑
k:µxk (m)≥mw
γk = ∑
j≥mw
xm,j ≥ ∑
k:µ
y
k(m)≥mw
γk = ∑
j≥mw
ym,j.
Therefore, the partial order (M) is equivalent to 
⋆
M. 
Notice that, since the two partial orders are equivalent, the binary operations de-
fined in Roth et al. (1993) and the ones defined in this paper, according to Definition 5,
are also equivalent. Since ⊻X and ⊼X are defined for a more general market than the
ones defined by Roth et al. (1993), we say that ⊻X and ⊼X of Definition 5, generalize
the binary operations defined by Roth et al. (1993).
5.2 Binary operations for Rational random stable matchings
In this subsection, with no need of the algorithm presented in Section 3, we compute
the g.l.b. and l.u.b. for two rational random stable matchings. A rational random stable
matching is a random stable matching where each scalar of the lottery is a rational
number.
Let x and y be two rational random stable matchings, represented as follows:
x = ∑
i∈I
αiµ
x
i , (2)
such that, 0 < αi ≤ 1; ∑i∈I αi = 1, µ
x
i ∈ S(P), αi is a rational number and µ
x
i ≥F µ
x
i+1;
where I = {i : i = 1, ..., l}.
y = ∑
j∈J
β jµ
y
j , (3)
such that, 0 < β j ≤ 1; ∑j∈J β j = 1, µ
y
j ∈ S(P), β j is a rational number and µ
y
j ≥F µ
y
j+1;
where J = {j : j = 1, ..., h}.
Since αi and β j are positive rational numbers, we have that for each αi there are
natural numbers ai, bi such that αi =
ai
bi
. In the same way, for each β j there are natural
numbers cj, dj such that β j =
cj
dj
.
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Denote by e the least common multiple (lcm) of all denominators bi, dj for each i ∈ I
and for each j ∈ J. That is,
e = lcm(b1, . . . , bl, d1, . . . , dh).
Then, we can write αi =
ai
bi
=
ai
e
bi
e and βi =
cj
dj
=
cj
e
dj
e for each i ∈ I and for each
j ∈ J. In this way, we can write all the scalars α and β with the same denominator.
Denote by γk =
1
e and define
µ˜
x
k :=


µx1 for k = 1, . . . ,
a1
b1
e
µx2 for k =
a1
b1
e+ 1, . . . , a2b2 e
...
...
µxl for k =
al−1
bl−1
e+ 1, . . . , albl
e
µ˜
y
k :=


µ
y
1 for k = 1, . . . ,
c1
d1
e
µ
y
2 for k =
c1
d1
e+ 1, . . . , c2d2 e
...
...
µ
y
h for k =
ch−1
dh−1
e+ 1, . . . , chdh
e
Then, we have that
x =
l
∑
i=1
αiµ
x
i =
l
∑
i=1
ai
bi
µxi =
l
∑
i=1
ai
e
bi
e
µxi =
e
∑
k=1
1
e
µ˜xk .
In the same way, we have that
y =
h
∑
j=1
β jµ
y
j =
h
∑
j=1
cj
dj
µ
y
j =
h
∑
j=1
cj
e
dj
e
µ
y
j =
e
∑
k=1
1
e
µ˜
y
k .
Then, it is easy to compute the x ⊻F y and x ⊼F y. Similarly for x ⊻W y and x ⊼W y.
Now, we formally state the theorem.
Theorem 4 Let x and y be two rational random stable matchings (i.e. each α and each β in (2)
and (3) are rational numbers). Then, for X ∈ {F,W} we have that
x ⊻X y =
e
∑
k=1
1
e
(µ˜xk ∨X µ˜
y
k) and x ⊼X y =
e
∑
k=1
1
e
(µ˜xk ∧X µ˜
y
k).
Example 1:(Continued) Let x and y be two random stable matchings represented as in Theorem
1,
x = 14x
ν1 + 12x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 ,
y = 16x
ν1 + 12x
ν3 + 13x
ν4 .
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Let e = lcm(2, 3, 4, 6) = 12. Then, the random stable matchings x and y can be represented
as:
x = 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν2 + 112x
ν2 + 112x
ν2 + 112x
ν2 + 112x
ν2
+ 112x
ν2 + 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 ,
y = 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν3 + 112x
ν3 + 112x
ν3 + 112x
ν3 + 112x
ν3 + 112x
ν3
+ 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 .
Then,
x ⊻F y =
1
12x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν1
+ 112x
ν1 + 112x
ν2 + 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4 + 112x
ν4
= 23x
ν1 + 112x
ν2 + 14x
ν4 .
Analogously for x ⊼F y, x ⊻W y and x ⊼W y.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we prove an important result that involves two very studied topics in the
matching literature: random stable matchings and lattice structure. We prove that the
set of random stable matchings has a dual lattice structure for a very general matching
markets like many-to-many matching markets with substitutable preferences satisfy-
ing the law of aggregated demand. These markets, are the most general matching
markets for in which it is known that the binary operations between two stable match-
ings (l.u.b and g.l.b) are computed via a pointing functions. For more general matching
markets, for instance markets that only satisfy substitutability (not the LAD), the bi-
nary operations are computed as fixed points. Then, the lattice structure of the set of
random stable matchings for these markets is still an open problem, and it’s left for
future research.
7 Appendix
Lemma 3 There exists ν ∈ A, such that ν ∈ C1
Proof. Let (i′, j′) ∈ supp(x) such that xi′,j′ = α1. Then, by definition of α1, we have
that x
µ1
i′,j′ = 1. Since µ
1 is computed via pointing function, then we have that there is
ν˜ ∈ A such that xν˜i′,j′ = 1. Therefore, ν˜ ∈ C1 
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Lemma 4 Given βl defined in the proof of Theorem 1, then ∑
I
l=1 βl = 1.
Proof. Let βl defined as: β1 = α1, β2 = (1− α1)α2, β3 = (1− α1)(1− α2)α3, ... We will
prove that ∑Il=1 βl = 1 by mathematical induction over the steps that it takes for x
l to
be an incidence vector of a stable matching in the proof of Theorem 1
• If x1 ∈ S(P). Then,
β1 = α1, β2 = (1− α1)
1
∑
l=1
βl = α1 + (1− α1) = 1
• If xn ∈ S(P). Then,
β1 = α1, β2 = (1− α1)α2, β3 = (1− α1)(1− α2)α3, ...,
βn−1 = (1− α1)(1− α2) · · · (1− αn−1)αn, βn = (1− α1)(1− α2) · · · (1− αn−1)(1− αn)
n
∑
l=1
βl = α1 + (1− α1)α1 + ...+ (1− α1)(1− α2) · · · (1− αn−1)(1− αn) = 1
• If xn+1 ∈ S(P). Then we will prove that ∑
n+1
l=1 βl = 1.
n+1
∑
l=1
βl = α1 + (1− α1)α2 + ...+
(1− α1)(1− α2) · · · (1− αn−1)(1− αn)αn+1+
(1− α1)(1− α2) · · · (1− αn−1)(1− αn)(1− αn+1) =
α1+(1− α1)α2+ ...+
[
(1− α1)(1− α2) · · · (1− αn−1)(1− αn)
][
αn+1 + (1− αn+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
]
=
n
∑
l=1
βl = 1

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